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APPORTIONMENT OF CORPORATE INCOME TO
THE STATES FOR TAX PURPOSES: FIFTY WAYS
TO LOSE YOUR TAX DOLLAR
At issue in the recent case of Moorman Manufacturing Co.
v. Bair' was the constitutionality of Iowa's system for determin-
ing what portion of the income of interstate manufacturing
corporations should be assigned to that state for tax purposes.
The Iowa statute apportioned such corporate net income on the
basis of the ratio of the amount of sales made to destinations
within Iowa to the total amount of sales made by the corpora-
tion.2 The Iowa Supreme Court in the Moorman case upheld
the statute in the face of attacks upon it as being violative of
the due process and equal protection clauses of the United
States and Iowa Constitutions and the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. However, the issue may not yet be
resolved as the United States Supreme Court has recently
noted probable jurisdiction to hear the case.
Apportionment is an important issue in interstate com-
merce. In 1972, the latest year for which such statistics are
available, over 95 billion dollars of corporate net income was
subject to state taxation. Almost two-thirds of this amount,
more than 62 billion dollars, was derived from manufacturing
and mercantile operations.3 Statistics also indicate that manu-
facturing and mercantile concerns are quite likely to carry on
business across state lines and, consequently, have to divide
their income among several states for income tax purposes.'
Regardless of the nature of the business, every corporation
which operates in two or more states must deal with the pros-
pect of paying income taxes in more than one state and divid-
ing its income accordingly.
Formula apportionment is the principal method used for
1. 254 N.W.2d 737 (Iowa 1977), prob. juris. noted, 98 S. Ct. 478, No. 77-454 (Nov.
14, 1977).
2. IOWA CODE § 422.33 (1975).
3. I.R.S., STATISTICS OF INCOME-1972 CORPORATE INCOME TAX RETURNS, Table 1
(1976). Although these statistics are based upon figures for taxable net income appear-
ing on federal tax returns, most states use essentially the same figure for their own tax
purposes. See text accompanying nQtes 25-26, infra. Therefore, these statistics are
equally applicable to state income taxes.
4. See SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP.
No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1964) [hereinafter cited as REP. 1480].
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effectuating this division of income.' Although Iowa's formula
is the only one which apportions income entirely upon the basis
of sales,6 all but three of the forty-six jurisdictions in the United
States which impose a corporate income tax include a sales
factor in their apportionment formulas.7 Thus, the final deci-
sion on the validity of Iowa's single-factor sales apportionment
system is likely to have significant repercussions in the entire
area of state corporate income taxation.
I. THE Moorman CASE
A. Moorman Manufacturing Company
Moorman Manufacturing Company is typical of the type of
interstate corporation whose income is subject to apportion-
ment. Its principal source of income for the years in question
was the manufacture and sale of some eighty different products
for feeding livestock and poultry. Moorman, an Illinois corpo-
ration, did all of its manufacturing in the states of Illinois,
Texas and Nebraska. Its products were sold in more than thirty
states. One of those states was Iowa, where Moorman operated
six warehouses and maintained a force of over 500 employees
who engaged in "continuous solicitation of Iowa customers." 8
Manufacturing all of its products in only three states and
selling these products primarily to customers outside of the
state of manufacture, Moorman Manufacturing is considered
a "unitary business." A business is said to be "unitary" when
"the operation of the portion of the business within the state
is dependent upon or contributory to the operation of the busi-
ness outside the state."9 Because of the nature of a unitary
business, it is impossible to determine precisely where the prof-
its of such a business arise. Consequently, a corporation en-
gaged in a unitary business must resort to the somewhat arbi-
5. Id. at 113.
6. Missouri allows the taxpayer the option of apportioning income upon the basis
of sales alone. Mo. REV. STAT. § 143.51 (Supp. 1975).
7. In the large majority of these forty-three jurisdictions, the formulas consist of
three equally-weighted factors: property, payroll and sales. Arizona and Mississippi
have no statutorily-prescribed apportionment formula, though both states appear to
recognize apportionment as one method of dividing income for tax purposes. West
Virginia's formula contains only the two factors of property and payroll. [1977] STATE
TAX GUIDE (CCH) 10,203 - 10,943.
8. 254 N.W.2d at 738-39.
9. G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 101 (2d ed.
1950).
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trary method of apportionment to divide its income among the
states in which it operates so that each state will tax only those
profits earned within its borders. Typical of this type of busi-
ness is the manufacturing concern such as Moorman and, to a
lesser extent, the mercantile business, consisting of the pur-
chase of goods in one state for sale in another state.'0
Apportionment is a method of dividing income by multiply-
ing the corporation's income by a ratio. That ratio is the
amount of a certain aspect of the corporation's business located
within the state divided by the total amount of that aspect for
the corporation as a whole. Thus, Iowa's method, based en-
tirely upon sales, operates by multiplying the corporation's in-
come by the ratio of the amount of corporate sales within Iowa
to the total amount of corporate sales. It is upon this resulting
figure that the Iowa corporate income tax is levied. In the ma-
jority of states a three factor system is used. The corporation's
net income is multiplied by the arithmetic average of three
ratios: corporate property within the taxing state to total cor-
porate property, corporate payroll within the state to total pay-
roll and corporate sales within the state to total sales."
Business concerns in a number of industries are usually
considered "nonunitary.' 2 The operation by one firm of a dairy
farm in Wisconsin and a haberdashery in Brooklyn would gen-
erally not be treated as a single unitary business. Since, by
definition, the nonunitary business of a firm in one state is not
dependent upon the firm's operations elsewhere, it is at least
theoretically possible to determine which of the firm's gross
10. See Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business
Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX L. REV. 171, 194 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Rudolph]; Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment
and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 487, 496, 501-03 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Hellerstein, Unitary Business].
11. An example will serve to illustrate both how the system operates and how the
choice of apportionment formula affects the total amount of income which is taxable
in the state of sale for a firm such as Moorman. If a corporation's net income were $100
and the total amounts of its property, payroll and sales were $100 each and the
amounts of each of those factors located within the taxing state were 5, 15 and 20
respectively, the amount of income taxable under the Iowa system would be 20/100 x
$100, or $20. Under the three factor system (5/100 + 15/100 + 20/100)/3 x $100, or only
$13, would be taxable.
12. Mining, banking, farming and hotel operations have been mentioned as exam-
ples of businesses which can be operated so as not to be unitary despite the fact that
the same corporation carries on the same business in several states. Hellerstein,
Unitary Business, supra note 10, at 496-97.
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receipts and expenses should be assigned to that state. The net
income taxable in that state can then be determined without
resorting to apportionment. This process of separate account-
ing is the only method, other than apportionment, which is
used to any significant degree by corporations to divide their
ordinary business income among the various states for tax pur-
poses.'13 Often it is the only alternative offered to replace for-
mula apportionment.'4
The separate accounting method has serious drawbacks as
an alternative to apportionment in the case of manufacturing
corporations such as Moorman. Maintaining books of account
which break down all of the manufacturer's operations on a
state-by-state basis is quite expensive. Furthermore, in order
to keep a different set of books for both the state of manufac-
ture and the state of sale, it is necessary to devise an "imputed
price" at which the manufacturing operation "sells" the prod-
uct to the sales operation.' 5 However, this "imputed price" is,
of necessity, an accountant's construct. Regardless of whether
the figure is intended to equal the price at which such goods
would be available in the open market or is simply based upon
a cost plus reasonable profit formula, the statistics upon which
to base such estimates are in many cases "simply nonexis-
tent.""'
Besides these practical drawbacks, the practice of separate
accounting may also suffer from a theoretical defect which
could make it an inappropriate tool for division of income, not
only for manufacturing concerns such as Moorman, but also for
highly diversified conglomerates as well. The idea that a corpo-
ration may sustain losses in some parts of its business, while
13. The oil and gas industry has been called a "stronghold for separate account-
ing." Rudolph, supra note 10, at 187. But see Amoco Products Co. v. Arnold, 213 Kan.
636, 518 P.2d 453 (1974); Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 417,
386 P.2d 40, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963).
14. See Hellerstein, The Unitary Business Principle and Multicorporate Enter-
prises: An Examination of the Major Controversies, 27 TAx EXECUTIVE 313, 315 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hellerstein, Major Controversies].
15. The net income attributable to the manufacturing state would be this imputed
"sales price" minus the costs of manufacturing; the net income attributable to the
sales operations would be the actual sales price minus the "sales price" it "paid" for
the goods.
16. "Where will you find independents who will sell automobiles to manufacturers
or wholesalers in the quantities, product breakdown, delivery dates, credit and other
terms at which General Motors delivers to its sales divisions?" Hellerstein, Major
Controversies, supra note 14, at 316. See also REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 163-67.
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realizing profits in others, has been criticized as "both archaic
and myopic."' 7 The example is given of an oil company that
drills nine wells in nine states, eight of which prove unproduc-
tive and one of which is successful enough to offset the losses
in the other states. Perhaps it is better to treat the entire opera-
tion as a moderate success, rather than to recognize losses in
eight states and a huge profit in the ninth. The latter would be
the result under separate accounting.'8 One of the reasons given
for the success of conglomerates is the ability of such an opera-
tion to spread the risks of highly diverse lines of manufacture
so as to be able to absorb losses in one area without bankrupt-
ing the entire operation.19 Here again, separate accounting does
not recognize this interdependence.
It is because of the practical problems involved with sepa-
rate accounting and the consequent difficulty in administering
a corporate income tax system which uses it as a method of
income division that state tax administrators prefer use of the
more easily applied formula apportionment system. 0 Many
courts place a heavy burden upon the proponent of separate
accounting, regardless of whether it is the tax administrator or
the taxpayer that is attempting to deviate from statutory ap-
portionment. 2' As a result, separate accounting, though not
entirely obsolete, is clearly on the wane as a method of dividing
income for purposes of state corporate income taxation. 22 While
17. Keesling and Warren, California's Uniform Division of Income for Tax Pur-
poses Act, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rlv. 156, 172 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Keesling and
Warren].
18. Id. at 173-74.
19. Id. at 172 n.47. See also Hellerstein, Major Controversies, supra note 14, at 317.
20. Goldstein, Allocation of Income for Purposes of Corporate Taxation, 1 TAX L.
REv. 149, 150-51 (1946).
21. See PETERS, STATE INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF INTERSTATE BUSINESS, 1 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 899, 950-56
(New York University 1975) [hereinafter cited as PETERs], and cases cited therein.
22. See Rudolph, supra note 10, at 191. While separate accounting began as the
preferred method of division of income, a shift toward apportionment soon occurred
so that by 1929 six of the sixteen corporate income tax jurisdictions did not allow
separate accounting and in 1963 only five of the thirty-eight such jurisdictions indi-
cated a preference for it. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 115. Despite the fact that eight
more states have adopted a corporate income tax since then, only three states, Arizona,
Hawaii and Mississippi, indicate any preference for separate accounting today. See
[1977] STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 10,203 - 10,943. But cf. Rudolph, supra note 10,
at 192; Hellerstein, Unitary Business, supra note 10, at 503 (indicating that the Su-
preme Court may in the future circumscribe the doctrine of "unitary business" and
begin to require separate accounting in certain instances).
[Vol. 61:480
COMMENTS
there has been a trend away from its use by manufacturing and
mercantile concerns for quite some time,2 as separate account-
ing is used less by the other types of businesses, formulary
apportionment and the Moorman case assume an even greater
importance. 21
B. Analysis of the Iowa Apportionment System
In many respects, the Iowa apportionment system is quite
typical of the income division methods used in the several
states. Except for adjustments made to allow for exempt in-
come, changes in basis and federal income taxes, taxable "net
income" under the Iowa system is the same as that computed
for federal tax purposes .25 Most of the states follow this practice
of essentially adopting the federal definition of taxable "net
income." For the most part, states use the taxable income fig-
ure from the federal return, requiring only minor adjustments
which involve simple addition or subtraction of amounts which
are readily available from either the federal return or other
reasonably convenient sources.26
The tax rate applied to corporate net income attributable
to Iowa is graduated with all income over $100,000 being taxed
at a rate of ten percent. If the trade or business of a corpora-
tion is "carried on entirely within the state," the graduated
rate is applied to its entire net income. If that trade or business
is "carried on partly within and partly without the state," the
income tax is imposed "only on the portion of the net income
reasonably attributable to the trade or business within the
state."
28
The method for determining the portion of income
"reasonably attributable" to instate operations is a statutorily
prescribed two-step process. The first step involves allocation
of interest, dividends, rents, and royalties (less related expen-
23. See REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 162.
24. Two bills before Congress at the present time would prescribe an apportion-
ment formula for the states. The result reached by use of the federal formula would
constitute a maximum amount of income which a state could attribute to itself for
income tax purposes. No provision is made for separate accounting. See S. 2173, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 669, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also text accompa-
nying notes 192-201, infra.
25. IOWA CODE § 422.35 (1975).
26. See REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 279.
27. IowA CODE § 422.33 (1975).
28. Id. § 422.33(1).
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ses) either to the state of Iowa or to another state, depending
upon the location of the income-producing activity.29 Unlike
apportionment, which divides income among the several states
with which it was associated, this process of allocation segre-
gates particular portions of income. Each portion, in its en-
tirety, is either included in or excluded from taxable net in-
come. Most of the other corporate income tax states follow this
practice of specifically allocating certain types of nonbvusiness
income before applying the apportionment fraction. Several
states have adopted, in whole or in part, the Uniform Division
of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA),3" which specifically
allocates rents and royalties from tangible property, capital
gains, interest, dividends and patent or copyright royalties to
the extent that they constitute "nonbusiness income."3' The
UDITPA defines "nonbusiness income" as income not "arising
from transactions and activity in the regular course of the tax-
payer's trade or business."32
Despite this apparent uniformity, the treatment of nonbusi-
ness income has been characterized as "[o]ne of the more
glaring nonuniform aspects" of interstate taxation.3 3 States
vary on the types of income required to be specifically allo-
cated 34 and the state to which such segregated income is to be
attributed.3 Differences exist even among states which have
adopted the UDITPA.3 1 It is conceivable that one state might
29. Id. § 422.33(1)(a).
30. As of this writing, twenty-six of the forty-six jurisdictions (including forty-five
states and the District of Columbia) which impose a corporate income tax have
adopted the UDITPA. Two more have adopted the Multistate Tax Compact, which
includes the UDITPA in its provisions. [1977] STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH), at 1042-44.
For a discussion of important deviations from the provisions of the UDITPA among
these states, see notes 203-04, infra.
31. UDITPA § 4.
32. UDITPA § 1(a).
33. Nemeth and Agee, State Taxation of Multistate Business: Resolution or
Stalemate?, 48 TAxES 237, 249 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nemeth and Agee].
34. See REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 198-200. For example, whereas Iowa specifically
allocates only interest, dividends, rents and royalties, the UDITPA applies the method
to all "nonbusiness" capital gains also.
35. Id. at 200-15. Whereas some states, such as Iowa, allocate nonbusiness income
to the location of the income-producing activity, the UDITPA allocates such income
to various places, including the taxpayer's commercial domicile and the location of the
property, as well as the location of the income-producing activity, depending upon the
specific type of income involved. UDITPA §§ 5-8.
36. One of the "major differences" among the varying sets of regulations adopted
to supplement the UDITPA in the states which have adopted the Act is in provisions
classifying particular types of income as either "business" or "nonbusiness." Peters,
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allocate "nonbusiness" income to itself and another state
might either allocate that same income to itself or consider it
to be "business" income and apportion a fraction of the income
to itself. Therefore, this lack of uniformity can result in certain
corporate income being taxed by more than one state.37
It is more likely, however, that the business/nonbusiness
distinction results in undertaxation so that less than 100 per-
cent of a corporation's available income is taxed. Because the
facts upon which the distinction rests are within the corpora-
tion's exclusive control, a taxpayer may take advantage of this
loophole by shuffling the same income from the "business" to
the "nonbusiness" category and back again to avoid being
taxed on its entire income."
This tactic may well be responsible for the declining sup-
port for the business/nonbusiness distinction among state tax
administrators and its characterization as one of the "least
satisfactory aspects of UDITPA."39 Even in those states which
retain the distinction, there is a strong bias among administra-
tors toward apportioning all net income, without first allocat-
ing any portion of it.4" Many business tax practitioners also
consider the distinction unworkable and believe that it should
be abandoned in favor of apportionment of all corporate net
An Analysis of Important Recent Developments in the State and Local Tax Area, 39
J. TAx. 172, 176 (1973). Difficult disputes arise under the UDITPA as to whether
particular types of transactions, such as the sale of tangible property used in trade or
business, constitute "business" or "nonbusiness" activities. See Keesling and Warren,
supra note 17, at 164. Disputes also arise as to the state to which particular types of
"nonbusiness" activities should be attributed. See, e.g., id. at 165-67 (arguing that the
UDITPA attribution provisions should have been modified in California to conform to
the state's previous practice).
37. Developments in the Law, Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate
Business, 75 HARv. L. REv. 953, 1011 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the
Law].
38. For example, if 50% of a corporate taxpayer's income is from intangibles which
would be allocable to state A and its apportionment fraction is 60% in state A and 40%
in state B, the corporation might be able to treat its entire income as apportionable
business income in state A, thereby being taxed on 60% in state A, while at the same
time treating the 50% intangibles income as nonbusiness in state B, thereby incurring
a tax on only 40% of the remaining 50% of its income, or 20%, in state B. The result is
that only 80% of the corporate income is taxed, 60% in state A and 20% in state B.
Corrigan, Interstate Corporate Income Tax-Recent Revolutions and a Modern
Response, 29 VAND. L. REv. 423, 424-25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Corrigan].
39. GLAZER, PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO AREAS OF CONFLICT IN TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
BUSINESS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION
983, 992 (New York University 1975) [hereinafter cited as GLAZER].
40. PETERS, supra note 21, at 916.
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income." Since a number of states have either abolished or
restricted the use of the business/nonbusiness distinction and
specific allocation," apportionment, as the only major alter-
native, is becoming more important as a method for dividing
nonbusiness income among the states for tax purposes.
In Iowa, apportionment is statutorily prescribed only for the
business income of manufacturing and mercantile concerns. In
other industries the income remaining after allocation of non-
business income is "specifically allocated or equitably appor-
tioned within and without the state under rules of the direc-
tor."'43 However, income "derived from the manufacture or sale
of tangible personal property" is apportioned to Iowa "in that
proportion which the gross sales made within the state bear to
the total gross sales. '44
As mentioned earlier, Iowa is the only state to apportion
corporate income entirely upon the basis of sales. The three-
factor property-payroll-sales formula has long been the pre-
dominant system for apportionment of income among the
states for tax purposes. In 1963, twenty-six of the thirty-eight
corporate income tax jurisdictions utilized such a three-factor
formula. 5 As of this writing, forty-one of the forty-six jurisdic-
tions which impose a corporate income tax either statutorily
prescribe a three-factor formula or allow it as an option to the
taxpayer.46
This apparent uniformity is misleading for several reasons.
The states differ on the question of when a particular sale is to
41. Nemeth and Agee, supra note 33, at 249. See also Cahoon and Brown, The
Interstate Tax Dilemma-A Proposed Solution, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 187, 195 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Cahoon and Brown].
42. As of this writing, 8 of the 46 corporate income jurisdictions do not include
specific allocation of nonbusiness income in their statutorily-prescribed method for
division of income: Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Rhode Island and Vermont. [1977] STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 10,203 -
10,943. One of the bills on interstate commerce now pending in Congress would set a
maximum amount of income attributable to a state for corporate income tax purposes
by prescribing an apportionment formula for a corporation's entire net income without
making any allowance for specific allocation of portions of that income. H.R. 669, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). But cf. Keesling and Warren, supra note 17, at 159 (criticizing
a predecessor of the present bill for its failure to recognize and allow for specific
allocation "in flagrant disregard of this time-honored practice" and creating "serious
constitutional questions").
43. IOWA CODE § 422.33(1)(b) (1975).
44. Id.
45. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 119.
46. See [1977] STATE TAX GUIDE 10,203-10,943.
[Vol. 61:480
COMMENTS
be assigned to the taxing state. Iowa defines "gross sales made
within the state" to include all "gross sales from goods deliv-
ered or shipped to a purchaser within the state regardless of the
f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale."4 With two excep-
tions, the Iowa definition of "sales made within the state" con-
forms to the UDITPA definition.48
As of 1963 this "destination" test was by no means univer-
sal. In fourteen of the thirty-eight income tax jurisdictions sales
were assigned to a state based upon the location of such things
as the property at the time of sale (the "origin" test),49 the sales
office through which the sale was negotiated, and the sales
activity which generated the sale or acceptance, without regard
to the final destination of the product." In the intervening
years, however, there has been a very significant trend, both
among these states"1 and among those states which have since
enacted a corporate income tax,52 toward adopting the destina-
tion test. Nevertheless, as long as such diversity continues,
there is still a great danger of overlapping taxation.-3
Even more recently there has been another trend toward
weighting the sales factor at greater than the usual one-third
of the apportionment formula. This variation in the weight
given the sales factor is another contributor to the lack of uni-
formity among states using the three-factor taxation formula.
In the past six years, four states "have taken a significant step
backwards with respect to uniformity' 54 by amending their
apportionment formulas to weight the sales factor as one-half,
47. IOWA CODE § 422.33(1)(b) (1975).
48. The two exceptions are that UDITPA also attributes to the taxing state sales
to the United States government and sales made into a state in which the taxpayer is
not taxable if the property is shipped from a place of storage within the taxing state.
These are called the UDITPA "throwback" provisions. UDITPA § 16(a)-(b). As a
matter of fact, the Iowa statute has been amended twice recently to adopt essentially
the UDITPA wording without the throwback provisions. 1971 Iowa Acts ch. 165, §§
36-37; 1975 Iowa Acts ch. 210, § 1.
49. The UDITPA throwback provisions adopt this "origin" test for sales to the
United States government and sales to purchasers located in jurisdictions where the
taxpayer is not taxable. See note 48 supra.
50. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 120-21.
51. See, e.g., 1967 Conn. Pub. Acts no. 586, § 1; 1966 Ky, Acts ch. 176 pt. I, § 6;
1971 Wis. Laws ch. 125, § 373. See also text accompanying notes 93-94, infra.
52. See, e.g., 1969 Me. Pub. & Spec. Acts ch. 154, § F(1); 1965 N.M. Laws ch. 203,
§ 17; 1975 Pa. Laws no. 228, § 52.
53. See Development in the Law, supra note 37, at 1012.
54. PTRs, supra note 21, at 956.
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and each of the other two factors as only one-fourth, of the
overall formula.55
Lastly, with respect to the Iowa division of income system,
the statute does provide that, if upon objection by the taxpayer
"the director shall conclude that the method of allocation and
apportionment theretofore employed is in fact inapplicable and
inequitable," he "shall redetermine the taxable income by such
other method of allocation and apportionment as seems best
calculated to assign to the state for taxation the portion of the
income reasonably attributable to business and sources within
the state" not to exceed the amount computed under the statu-
tory rules.56 Most states have such a "safety valve" clause. In
at least one state, which previously had not provided for such
director discretion in its statutes or regulations, the adminis-
trator did permit an extrastatutory tax settlement in those
cases where use of the prescribed formula would produce an
"unduly harsh result. 5 7 The UDITPA provides for the use of
alternate methods in cases where the statutory result does "not
fairly represent the extent of the taxpayer's business activity
in this state."58 However, at least with respect to the UDITPA
provision, "departures from the basic formula should be
avoided except where reasonableness requires."59 In most states
such provisions are rarely used."
C. The Moorman Decision
Under the discretionary provision in the Iowa statute the
State Tax Commission had allowed Moorman to use the
standard three-factor formula to apportion its "business"
income to the state from 1949, the first fiscal year in which
Moorman filed an Iowa return, until the fiscal year ending on
March 31, 1960. Then, at the direction of the Tax Commis-
sion, Moorman utilized the Iowa single-factor sales formula to
55. 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-278; 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 684; 1975 N.Y. Laws ch. 895, §
210 (1st Spec. Sess.); 1973 Wis. Laws ch. 90.
56. IOWA CODE § 422.33(2) (1975).
57. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 235.
58. The alternate methods include (a) separate accounting, (b) the exclusion of one
or more apportionment factors, (c) the inclusion of one or more additional apportion-
ment factors, and (d) "any other method." UDITPA § 18.
59. Pierce (author of UDITPA), The Uniform Division of Income for State Tax
Purposes, 35 TAXES 747, 781 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Pierce]. See also Keesling
and Warren, supra note 17, at 171-72.
60. See Rep. 1480, supra note 4, at 235.
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apportion its "business" income to the state for fiscal years
1961 through 1964.61 However, beginning with fiscal year
1965, Moorman switched back to the standard formula for
apportionment of income without the consent of the State Tax
Commission.62 Several years later, the Iowa Director issued an
order requiring Moorman to use the one-factor sales apportion-
ment formula for fiscal years 1968 through 1972. Moorman took
exception to this order and appealed to the Iowa district
court.63
The choice between the two formulas involved substantial
differences in the amount of Moorman's income to be attrib-
uted to Iowa for tax purposes. For example, for fiscal year 1968,
Moorman's property, payroll and sales factors for Iowa were
4.08, 15.6 and 22.6 percent respectively.64 Thus, under the Iowa
one-factor sales formula, Moorman's apportionment percen-
tage was 22.6. In comparison, under the standard formula the
percentage would have been the arithmetical mean of all three
factors-only 14.1.65 Thus, utilizing the Iowa formula instead
of the standard three-factor formula would result in an addi-
tional 8.5 percent of Moorman's net income being taxed in
Iowa. Moorman argued that between Iowa and its domicile,
Illinois, which employs the standard three-factor formula, it
was being taxed on 141.8 percent of its income.66
Moorman's attack on the original order issued by the Direc-
tor was based upon three contentions. First, it argued that the
Iowa single-factor sales apportionment formula was facially
unconstitutional. Second, it contended that even if the formula
were not facially unconstitutional, it was unconstitutional as
61. In 1959, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a case which lowered
the jurisdictional barriers to state taxation of out-of-state corporations. Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959). See text accompanying
notes 110-17, infra.
62. On April 27th of 1965, the United States Supreme Court had invalidated the
single-factor sales apportionment formula used by the District of Columbia on statu-
tory grounds. General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553 (1965). See
text accompanying notes 180-85, infra.
63. 254 N.W.2d at 739-40.
64. The figures for Moorman's Iowa and total property were not given in the opin-
ion. Presumably the 4.08% represented the six warehouses Moorman maintained in the
state. The payroll and sales factors were computed as follows: payroll factor = Iowa
payroll/total payroll = $3,739,426/$23,919,381 = 15.6%; sales factor = Iowa sales/total
sales = $22,102,015/$97,719,800 = 22.6%.
65. 254 N.W.2d at 740.
66. Had all of the property and payroll which Moorman had in Iowa been located
in Illinois, this figure would have been 167%. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1977, at 4, col. 1.
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applied to Moorman in the disputed years. Finally, it con-
tended that even if the formula was not unconstitutional, ei-
ther facially or as applied, the failure of the Director to allow
Moorman to use an alternative formula constituted an abuse
of discretion in this case.6" The district court accepted Moor-
man's first contention and held that the statute was facially
unconstitutional in violation of the due process and commerce
clauses of the United States Constitution and the due process
clause of the Iowa Constitution.
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court and
held that the Iowa statute was facially constitutional. 9 In addi-
tion, the court rejected Moorman's other two contentions and
held that the Iowa apportionment formula was not unconstitu-
tional as applied to Moorman and that the Director had not
abused his discretion in failing to allow Moorman to use an
alternate formula."' On November 14, 1977, the United States
Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.71 To understand
the significance of the Moorman case and the effect which it
could have upon our present system of interstate taxation, it
is necessary to review how this system developed over the
years.
II. INTERSTATE TAXATION: EVOLUTION OF A MONSTER
A. Lack of Uniformity: The Source of the Problem
The adoption of a uniform apportionment formula by all
the corporate income tax states has long been recognized as
being far more important than the adoption of any particular
formula. 2 Some tax authorities feel that no single method of
67. 254 N.W.2d at 740.
68. The district court held that the Iowa single-factor sales formula violated the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution because it:
(a) does not fairly apportion interstate business activity to intrastate tax
values;
(b) causes multiple taxation of corporate net income by more than one taxing
jurisdiction; and
(c) provides local business with a direct commercial advantage not so en-
joyed by interstate business.
254 N.W.2d at 740-41.
69. Id. at 750, 752.
70. Id. at 754-55.
71. 98 S. Ct. 478, No. 77-454.
72. "What is most needed is a uniform rule. Just what rule shall be selected is less
important than the general adoption of the same rule by competing jurisdictions."
ADAMS, 1917 NAT'L TAx A. PRocaBINGS 185, 194. See Hellerstein, Unitary Business,
supra note 10, at 495.
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apportionment is best. However, since all methods are some-
what arbitrary, the only right rule is one which will be adopted
by all of the taxing states. 3 A uniform apportionment formula
would eliminate the possibility of over and undertaxation. Fur-
thermore, it would significantly reduce taxpayer compliance
costs and minimize the difficulties inherent in the administra-
tion of forty-six different tax systems.7 4
The present system is far from uniform. In 1964 an exhaus-
tive study by a House subcommittee on state taxation found
that "the effort to trace income to a supposed source through
the sales factor has led to a bewildering maze of complications
from which even the most eager taxpayer may be expected to
recoil. 75 The result of this bewildering complexity was not
burdensome compliance costs nor excessive taxation, but wide-
spread noncompliance, incomplete enforcement and a system
which operated "neither by published rules nor under adequate
supervision. ' 76 The burdens of overtaxation, in those relatively
few cases where it did occur, and disproportionate compliance
costs fell hardest upon small and moderate-sized taxpayers, for
whom "the system simply has no relation to their ability to
cope." 77 The report concluded that the system "works badly for
both business and the States . . . [and] . . . calls upon tax
administrators to enforce the unenforceable, and the taxpayer
to comply with the uncompliable. ' '78
While "some apportionment formulas are clearly unfair, no
one formula is agreed to be more appropriate than all others."7
Each state is motivated by a desire to adopt the formula which
is most advantageous, taxwise, to itself." For example, Iowa,
73. REPORT OF COMMITME ON THE APPORTIONmENT BsrwEEN STATES OF TAXEs ON
MERCANTILE AND MANUFACTURING BUSINESS, 1922 NAT'L TAX A. PROCEEDINGS 198, 206;
REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 130.
74. See Corrigan, supra note 38, at 439.
75. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 248. But cf. Keesling and Warren, supra note 17, at
157 (contending that the seriousness of widespread disparity "has been greatly exag-
gerated").
76. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 334. For an account of the different ways in which
corporations have used this diversified system to escape from being taxed on 100% of
their income, see Corrigan, supra note 38, at 429-36.
77. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 596. See also Corrigan, supra note 38, at 437-38. In
1963, about half of the corporations engaged in interstate commerce had fewer than
twenty employees. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 72.
78. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 598.
79. Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 967.
80. Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal,
46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1104 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hartman].
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considered an unindustrialized consumer state, has utilized an
apportionment formula based entirely upon sales by destina-
tion ever since it adopted the corporate income tax in 1934.1'
On the other hand, New York, a heavily industrialized state,
adopted a three-factor formula in 1944, which was based on
property, payroll and sales by origin. 8 The latter factor is
largely duplicative of property and payroll. Thus, both states
adopted formulas which were designed to assign the largest
possible fraction of corporate income to themselves. 3
This tendency toward nonuniform self-interested appor-
tionment formulas was counterbalanced in the manufacturing
states by domestic political pressure to adopt less production-
oriented formulas. Prior to 1957, North Carolina had appor-
tioned foreign corporation income on the basis of two such
formulas. The formula applied to manufacturing firms consis-
ted of two factors, property and manufacturing costs. In con-
trast, property and sales, assigned on the basis of location of
the sales office, were the two factors used in the case of mer-
cantile firms. These production-oriented formulas tended to
apportion to the state a large percentage of the income of
corporations having substantial assets within the state. They
were criticized as being unduly harsh in comparison to other
states' systems and a possible deterrent to economic develop-
ment.84 In response to mounting pressure from interstate
business concerns, a governor's commission recommended
the adoption of a three-factor apportionment formula, which
assigned sales by destination for all domestic and foreign man-
ufacturing and mercantile corporations. The commission's
recommendations were adopted in 19578 and on November
17th of that year an advertisement appeared in the New York
Times declaring that "North Carolina Reduces Taxes . . . to
81. 1933-34 Iowa Acts ch. 82, § 28 (Ex. Sess.).
82. 1944 N.Y. Laws ch. 415, § 2. When it initially adopted a franchise tax based
on net income in 1917, New York prescribed a three factor formula consisting of
property, accounts receivable and stock of other corporations. Accounts receivable
were assigned upon an origin basis and stock held in other corporations was assigned
on the basis of the physical property of the other corporations. 1917 N.Y. Laws ch. 726,
§ 1. This formula had the same tendency to apportion a large amount of income to
New York, a manufacturing state.
83. Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 966.
84. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 123.
85. 1957 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 1340, § 3.
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encourage more industry to locate and expand in the State."8
The following year South Carolina, which had previously
employed a two-factor system quite similar to the old North
Carolina formula, adopted the three-factor destination-sales
formula8 7 in order to remain competitive with its neighbor to
the north.88 The following year an advisory legislative council
in Virginia recommended that its production-oriented appor-
tionment formula be repealed. The council also recommended
the adoption of the North Carolina formula to remove the ap-
pearance of discrimination and to promote uniformity. 9 A year
later, in 1960, the recommendation was enacted into law.8
In response to similar pressures, New York, in 1961,
switched from its three-factor, origin-sales formula to one in
which the sales factor was computed fifty percent on an
"origin" basis and fifty percent on a "destination" basis.9" The
change was made to encourage manufacturing in New York,
despite an estimated revenue loss of eight million dollars per
year.9 2
Even today, states are still attempting to encourage domes-
tic business development through the adoption of sales-
oriented apportionment formulas. Wisconsin, one of the four
states which has recently adopted a double-weighted sales for-
mula,93 published a study of comparative state tax burdens one
year after enactment which noted that "[w]hen compared
with the 1973 study, tax costs in Wisconsin have decreased
dramatically ranking Wisconsin lower than every state initially
studied, except Texas."94 Thus, there is a very definite trend
among manufacturing states to moderate their self-interested
86. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 123-24. But cf. Due, Studies of State-Local Tax
Influences on Location of Industry, 14 NAT'L TAX J. 163 (1961). ("While the statistical
analysis and study of location factors are by no means conclusive, they suggest very
strongly that the tax effects [of various state and local tax levels] cannot be of major
importance.") Id. at 171.
87. 1958 S.C. Acts no. 731.
88. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 124-25.
89. These recommendations were made despite the committee's reservations that
the criticism of the old system was "not entirely well founded." Id. at 125-26.
90. 1960 Va. Acts. ch. 442.
91. 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 713, § 12.
92. Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 976-77 & n.126.
93. See text accompanying notes 54-55, supra.
94. WISCONSIN DEP'T OF REVENUE, COMPARATIVE TAX BURDENS ON SELECTED MANU-
FACTURERS IN FIFTEEN STATES 1 (1974) (emphasis in original).
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apportionment systems and adopt more sales-oriented formu-
las.
In contrast, there is little local pressure in consumer states
to moderate their self-interested formulas and adopt more
production-oriented formulas which emphasize the property
and payroll factors.9" Indeed, the opposite appears to be true.
In the 1950's a number of consumer or market states adopted
more sales-oriented approaches to income apportionment.9"
These changes were motivated, in part, by revenue concerns.9"
However, as with the manufacturing states, the prospect of
improving the tax climate for the politically influential home
industry while simultaneously attracting new business into the
states may well have been the controlling consideration.98
Perhaps the trend in both manufacturing and market states
to 'export' taxes by imposing them on nonvoting out-of-state
taxpayers" can best be explained by the simple fact that such
out-of-state corporations are not represented in the legislatures
which impose the taxes.99 "Interstate commerce . . . is a legis-
lator's dream: a lush source of tax revenue, the burden of which
falls largely on those who cannot vote him out of office. It is
the old problem of taxation without representation."',"
B. Bigger and Bigger Stakes: The Source of the Conflict
Despite its inherent tendency toward duplicitous taxation
of interstate commerce, interstate division of income and ap-
portionment was the source of relatively little controversy be-
fore the 1950's.'0 1 This may be due to the fact that income
taxation is a relatively recent innovation in public finance. The
first modern corporate income tax was passed by Wisconsin in
1911."2 After the federal tax was enacted in 1913, more states
95. See Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 976.
96. See text accompanying notes 108-09, infra.
97. Studenski, The Need for Federal Curbs on State Taxes on Interstate Com-
merce: An Economist's Viewpoint, 46 VA. L. REV. 1121, 1125 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Studenski]. But cf. Britton, State Taxation of Extraterritorial Value: Allocation of
Sales to Destination, 46 VA. L. REv. 1160, 1168 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Britton]
(indicating that whether a net revenue loss or increase resulted from the changes was
a question in which the states were "not overly interested").
98. Britton, supra note 97, at 1168. See also Studenski, supra note 97, at 1125.
99. See Corrigan, supra note 38, at 424.
100. MENDELSON, EPILOGUE TO F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 118 (1964).
See also Britton, Taxation Without Representation Modernized, 46 A.B.A.J. 369
(1960).
101. PETERS, supra note 21, at 901-02.
102. 1911 Wis. Laws ch. 658.
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began to adopt the income tax so that by 1960 thirty-seven of
the fifty states and the District of Columbia imposed corporate
income taxes.13 Although the corporate income tax accounted
for only about five to six percent of the general revenues of all
the states during these years, it was a significant source of
revenue in the taxing states, accounting for about ten percent
of the total taxes collected in those states.0 4
During this developmental period, these states did not ag-
gressively seek to tax interstate corporations.' 5 Their failure to
do so was partially attributable to the fact that interstate com-
merce was not as extensive as it is today. Moreover, as recently
as 1951 in the case of Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 0 the
Supreme Court had reaffirmed its doctrine that a state could
not tax a corporation for the privilege of carrying on a business
that was exclusively interstate in character. States attempted
to tax only those corporations which maintained some perma-
nent establishment within their borders, such as a manufac-
turing plant, a warehouse, a store or a regular office. As a re-
sult, the small and medium-sized firms, manufacturing in a
few states and selling in many more, were not particularly
burdened by lack of uniformity in state division of income. The
relatively few large corporations which did have permanent
establishments in more than just a few states were unable to
pressure the legislatures in those states to bring about a more
uniform system of state taxation. 07
After World War II, however, revolutionary advancements
in communication, transportation and distribution, as well as
the increasing sophistication of the structuring of corporate
enterprise, made it possible for businesses to operate at great
distances from their ultimate markets.' During the 1950's, the
so-called consumer or market states reacted by seeking to im-
pose their corporate income taxes on foreign corporations and
adopting apportionment formulas with destination sales as a
prime element."9 Although state apportionment systems have
103. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 100-03.
104. Id. at 110-11.
105. PE'ra_, supra note 21, at 901-02.
106. 340 U.S. 602, 609 (1951), citing Alpha Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S.
203, 216-17 (1925).
107. Studenski, supra note 97, at 1121, 1124.
108. Corrigan, supra note 38, at 424-25.
109. Studenski, supra note 97, at 1124-25; see also text accompanying notes 95-100,
supra.
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always been skewed toward enhancing state revenues, and
often at the expense of free trade, the burgeoning of interstate
commerce coupled with more aggressive out-of-state enforce-
ment by state tax administrators brought the problem to the
forefront during the 1950's.
In 1959, the Supreme Court decided the companion cases
of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and
Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings,10 two cases which
ended the relative calm in the area of interstate corporate taxa-
tion."' In Northwestern, Minnesota had attempted to impose
an income tax on an Iowa corporation whose only physical
connection with the state was a rented sales office with two
salesmen and a secretary. In the Stockham case, Georgia at-
tempted to tax a Delaware corporation which maintained a
single rented sales office with only one salesman in the state.
Both states utilized a three factor formula, with sales by des-
tination constituting one-third of the apportionment frac-
tion.12
The Supreme Court upheld the taxes in both cases, saying
that "net income from interstate operations of a foreign corpo-
ration may be subjected to state taxation provided the levy is
not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activi-
ties within the taxing state forming sufficient nexus to support
the same.""' The Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor holding
that a state could not tax business that was exclusively inter-
state was distinguished. While the Minnesota and Georgia
taxes were imposed directly upon net income, the tax in the
Spector case, although measured by net income, was imposed
upon the privilege of doing business within the state."4 This
distinction has been severely criticized" 5 and at least one writer
has contended that the Spector interstate commerce immunity
doctrine has since been entirely abandoned."6
110. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
111. PETERS, supra note 21, at 901-02.
112. Whereas Minnesota employed the standard three-factor formula, Georgia's
formula included an inventory factor in lieu of the standard property element. 358 U.S.
at 453-57.
113. Id. at 452.
114. Id. at 463-64.
115. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 80, at 1100 (saying that this "judicially
spawned distinction. . . has about as much substance as soup made from the shadow
of an emaciated sparrow"). See also Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 961.
116. Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court,
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Three justices dissented in Northwestern and, in one of the
two dissenting opinions, Justice Frankfurter predicted that the
case would result in significant compliance burdens for the
"thousands of relatively small or moderate size corporations
doing exclusively interstate business spread over several
states" and that the volume of apportionment litigation "will
be multiplied many times when such formulas are applied to
the infinitely larger number of other businesses which are en-
gaged in exclusively interstate commerce."' 7
III. THE ELUSIVE GOAL OF UNIFORMITY
A. The Sales Factor in the UDITPA:
A Backward Step Toward Uniformity
In 1957, two years before the Northwestern decision, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Bar Association adopted the UDITPA.11s
The UDITPA includes the standard apportionment formula
with three equally-weighted factors: property, payroll and sales
by destination."'
Inclusion of the sales factor, the most controversial and
most criticized factor, has been defended on the basis that it
offsets the effects of the property and payroll factors and pro-
tects the interest of the state of destination. This seems appor-
priate since the market state is essential to the production of
sales income.' 0 There was also a second and more pragmatic
reason for the inclusion of a sales factor in the UDITPA for-
mula:
The much debated adoption of a sales factor in apportion-
ment formulas is attributable to at least two fact patterns.
Formula development has reflected the varying economic
positions of the states and, to a lesser degree, the assumed
need for a formula satisfactory to both "manufacturing" and
"market" states as a basis for compromise leading to formula
uniformity .... Thus, apportionment theory came to in-
1974 Term: Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. Rav. 149, 188
(1976).
117. 358 U.S. at 474-75.
118. UDITPA (U.L.A.) Hist. Note, at 365.
119. UDITPA § 9.
120. See Lynn, Formula Apportionment of Corporate Income for State Tax Pur-
poses: Natura Non Facit Saltum, 18 Omo ST. L.J. 84, 98 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Lynn].
1978]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
clude sales as a means of balancing claims of market states
vis-a-vis industrial states .... UDITPA . . .not surpris-
ingly reflects existing apportionment theory.'2 '
Similar reasons were given for the Act's adoption of the
"destination" test for sales. 2' The "origin" test was rejected
because it merely duplicated the property and payroll factors
and failed to recognize the contribution of the consumer states
toward the production of income.'1 The destination test was
preferred over standards based on negotiation or origin because
it is less susceptible to manipulation for tax purposes. 14
Following the Northwestern decision and the apparent low-
ering of jurisdictional taxation barriers, interstate taxation has
become a source of heated controversy125 with use of the sales
factor creating the most controversial issues. This may be at-
tributable to the difficulty encountered in determining pre-
cisely where a particular sale takes place.1 21 Perhaps a more
fundamental explanation is that the sales factor involves more
basic clashes of interest than the property and payroll factors.
The differences in the definitions of the latter two factors "do
not appear to be grounded in considerations more important
than the tastes and judgment of the draftsmen of existing
laws."'2
A major problem in testing the validity of the sales factor
is the lack of a definitive rule by which to judge a particular
tax or apportionment formula. The United States Supreme
Court has, in past cases, applied at least two tests, a "source"
test and a "benefits" test.
In upholding an apportionment formula against due process
121. Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined,
46 VA. L. Rzv. 1257, 1262 (1960) (emphasis added).
122. The Council of State Governments had proposed a tripartite sales factor in-
cluding negotiation, origin and destination as partial tests. The Controllors Institute
Committee had recommended a two-part sales factor including only the origin and
destination tests. Lynn, supra note 120, at 94, 99.
123. Pierce, supra note 59, at 780.
124. Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Income from a Multistate Business, 13
VAND. L. Rav. 21, 80 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hartman, Multistate Business.]
125. See, e.g., 46 VA. L. Rav. 1051 (1960) (an entire issue was devoted to the
problems of interstate taxation); Symposium, State Taxation of Interstate Business,
27 VAND. L. Rv. 335 (1976).
126. Hartman, Multistate Business, supra note 124, at 74. See also REP. 1480, supra
note 4, at 196.
127. Hellerstein, Allocation and Nexus in State Taxation of Interstate Business, 20
TAX. L. REv. 259, 267 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hellerstein, Interstate Business].
[Vol. 61:480
COMMENTS
and commerce clause attacks, the Court in Underwood Type-
writer Co. v. Chamberlain28 illustrated its application of the
"source" test:
The profits of the corporation were largely earned by a series
of transactions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut
and ending with sale in other States. . . .The legislature in
attempting to put upon this business its fair share of the
burden of taxation was faced with the impossibility of allo-
cating specifically the profits earned by the processes con-
ducted within its borders.'
The application of the "source" test, however, is beset with
the same difficulties faced in dealing with the causation issue
in negligence cases. A great many things may be said to have
been the "cause" or "source" of a particular amount of income.
The questions asked to determine the source of income are
similar to those posed to determine the legal cause of an event:
(1) whether but for the supposed cause, the effect would not
have occurred, and (2) whether the supposed cause
"substantially contributed" to the effect so that it may pro-
perly be considered a cause thereof. Thus, a particular state's
apportionment system is valid under the "source" test if the
income apportioned to the state would not have been produced
but for the involvement of the taxing state and the taxing state
has "substantially contributed" to the production of that in-
come.
Clearly, the sales factor complies with the first requirement
of this two-step analysis. Without the market state, the state
to which the sales factor apportions income, there would be no
profits at all. The market is a sine qua non of income for any
unitary business, a point conceded even by the opponents of
the sales factor. 3' However, this fact alone does not automati-
cally give rise to a right on the part of the market state to tax
that income. Something more is necessary. If this was a suffi-
cient basis for a state to exercise its taxing power, the state of
birth of any successful entrepreneur might claim a portion of
128. 254 U.S. 113 (1920). For a discussion of the Underwood case itself, see text
accompanying notes 175-77, infra.
129. 254 U.S. at 120-21, quoted in General Motors Corp. v. District of Columbia,
380 U.S. 553, 560-61 (1965).
130. See, e.g., Harriss, Economic Aspects of Interstate Apportionment of Business
Income, 37 TAXES 327, 362 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Harriss].
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his or her income throughout his or her entire business life,
regardless of the state in which that business was conducted.
Without a state of birth, no entrepreneur would be able to
produce any income. With the sine qua non subissue virtually
undisputed, the crux of the "source" controversy centers
around whether the market state "substantially contributes"
to the earning of interstate income so as to properly be consid-
ered a source of that income.
Both proponents and opponents of the sales factor recognize
that capital and labor are sources of interstate corporate in-
come, and, consequently, that property and payroll factors are
properly included in the apportionment formula.' 3' Opponents
of the sales factor contend, however, that labor and capital are
the only sources of income. 32 As of the time of sale, all profits
have been earned and, after the sale, a corporation does not
earn income within the market state simply by virtue of ship-
ments into that state.'33 Although the actual process of selling
and marketing is recognized as contributing to income, 34 to
include sales as a separate factor in the apportionment formula
is to arbitrarily assume that a dollar of property or payroll
devoted to selling is "substantially more productive in the deri-
vation of net income" than the dollar devoted to other aspects
of the unitary business.' 35 Furthermore, the sale itself does not
produce income; it simply represents the mutual exchange of
equivalent benefits.'3  Lastly, it is argued that the uncertain
way in which the market contributes to income is responsible
for the difficulty of assigning sales to a particular jurisdic-
tion. 17
131. See, e.g., Cox, The Interstate Tax Problem, 38 TAXES 417, 421-22 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Cox]. Some supporters of a two-factor, property-payroll appor-
tionment formula suggest that, perhaps the weighting of the two factors should be
changed to, for example, one to four, so as to reflect the proportionate contribution of
capital and labor, respectively, to the production of income in the economy as a whole.
See, e.g., Harriss, supra note 130, at 363.
132. Harriss, supra note 130, at 362; Barnes, Prerequisites of a Federal Statute
Regulating State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 46 VA. L. REv. 1269, 1278 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Barnes].
133. Britton, supra note 97, at 1166.
134. Harriss, supra note 130, at 362.
135. Barber (then Senior Tax Counsel of the Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation), A
Suggested Shot at a Gordian Knot of Income Apportionment, 13 NAT'L TAX J. 243, 248
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Barber].
136. Studenski, supra note 97, at 1131.
137. Cf. Barnes, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Nexus and
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The supporters of the sales factor contend that the market
does contribute to the production of income, 3 ' and that sales,
like manufacturing, should be recognized as a "major taxable
event.' 139 For example, during World War II, the prices of
second-hand cars increased sharply due to the dearth of new
cars available. It was this enhanced market, rather than the
application of property and payroll, which caused skyrocketing
used car profits. Furthermore, the importance of the market is
evidenced by the vast amounts of money spent to manipulate
it. Lastly, proponents of the sales factor argue that the classical
economist's conception of capital and labor as the source of
income, regardless of its merits, "has little or no bearing on tax
policy and, indeed, is contrary to tax postulates widely used in
this country."'40
Use of the sales factor is also a controversial issue under the
"benefits" test as applied by the Supreme Court. This test
differs from the "source" test in that the latter inquires as to
where the income arose, while the former looks to see what
governmental services were utilized in the production of that
income. Naturally, the two tests often yield the same result.
However, even though some writers have argued that this is
always the case,' the two tests would seem to give rise to
different results in certain cases. For example, a corporation
might operate two factories in two different states each manu-
facturing a different product, only one of which is sold at a
profit. Although the "source" test would tax all of the income
in the state of the profit-making product, the "benefits" test
Apportionment, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 218, 224 (1964) (arguing that the "unsoundness" of
the sales factor is responsible for the willingness of UDITPA states to adopt the
"origin" test in "throwback" situations). See also notes 48-49, supra. But cf. Lynn, The
Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-Examined, 46 VA. L. REv. 1257,
1266 (1960) (arguing that the throwback provisions for sales into states where the
taxpayer is not taxable should be eliminated precisely because of this inconsistency).
138. Cf. Lynn, The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act Re-
Examined, 46 VA. L. H'v. 1257, 1267 (1960) ("With respect to the sales factor, it is
difficult, at least for this writer, to reject completely the concept that the market
contributes to the generation of income.").
139. Cox, supra note 131, at 422. But cf. Harriss, supra note 130, at 362 n.3 (saying
that "[tihere are methods of taxing sales, of course, but the net income tax is not one
of them.").
140. Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 127, at 274-75. See also State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce: Roadway Express, The Diminishing Privilege Tax
Immunity, and the Movement Toward Uniformity in Apportionment, 36 U. Cm. L.
Rav. 186, 216 (1968):
141. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 132, at 1276-77.
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would tax each factory in proportion to the state services af-
forded it.4 2
Support for the "benefits" test is found in the following
language from Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co.:'
For constitutional purposes the decisive issue turns on the
operating incidence of a challenged tax. . . .[The] test is
whether property was taken without due process of law, or if
paraphrase we must, whether the taxing power exerted by the
state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and
benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling ques-
tion is whether the state has given anything for which it can
ask return.'44
Several difficulties are encountered in applying the
"benefits" test to the sales factor in state income tax appor-
tionment formulas. The first difficulty is that the income tax
itself does not satisfy the "benefits" test because corporate
income is a poor index of benefits received from goods and
services provided by the government. For that reason, some
authorities argue that the income tax is an undesirable state
tax.'45 Others argue that, despite this defect, the income tax is
more desirable from an economic standpoint than other forms
of taxation because it falls upon individuals who are currently
able to pay and does not discriminate among taxpayers on the
basis of occupation."6 In any event, the states are not about to
give up this valuable source of revenue, and they will continue
to impose the income tax even if it fails to conform to the
"benefits" principle.'47
Another problem with the "benefits" test is that it is elusive
and often fails to furnish any useful test of constitutionality.
Although some types of taxes, such as a highway use tax, can
easily be characterized as a quid pro quo, most types of govern-
ment expenditures, such as those for education and defense,
are not susceptible to this "bargained-for" analysis. The taxes
collected to pay for these expenditures "can be regarded only
142. See REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 158-59.
143. 311 U.S. 435 (1940).
144. Id. at 44, quoted in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,
358 U.S. 450, 465 (1959).
145. Morss, An Evaluation of the Report on State Taxation, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 297,
303 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Morss].
146. Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 1000-01.
147. Morss, supra note 145, at 303.
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as exactions by the state for the general benefits of living under
an organized government."'' 8 Even for these expenditures,
however, it is still relevant to inquire whether the tax imposed
to pay for them is subject to local political check. "'
Furthermore, under the "benefits" principle the beneficiary
is aware that the government goods and services he or she is
enjoying are not costless. Consequently, some writers argue
that even though benefit taxation will not guarantee an opti-
mum resource allocation, on efficiency grounds it is still proba-
bly the best general finance criterion for state government.'50
This arguement suggests a third test, an "efficiency" test,
which has not been endorsed by the Supreme Court. Under this
analysis, a tax is inadequate if it exhibits a "tendency to induce
sacrifices of efficiency, to cause modification of business meth-
ods in ways which are designed to save tax rather than to
enhance efficiency and productivity."''
Some writers argue that the sales factor complies with the
"benefits" test and that its inclusion in the apportionment
formula is in recognition of the economic benefits which flow
from the governmental services furnished by the customer's
state.'5 2 While the interstate corporation makes large invest-
ments and maintains substantial payrolls in the manufactur-
ing state, the "exploited" consumer state "receives little or no
budgetary gain for having furnished the market.' 15 3
Opponents of the sales factor characterize the benefits pro-
vided by the market state to the foreign producer as
"obscure"' 54 and "very modest and very indirect."'55 Certainly,
the benefits conferred by the market state are not nearly as
148. Developments in the Law, supra note 37, at 957.
149. Id. at 957-58.
150. Morss, supra note 145, at 300 & n.14.
151. Harriss, supra note 130, at 361. Perhaps this test should also include a consid-
eration of the tendency of a tax to fall in such a way that the prices of goods subject
to the tax would reflect all the government services and private resources which went
into making the product, but no more. Such a tax would foster efficiency in both the
production and the consumption of goods. Manufacturers and consumers would con-
tinue to produce and buy goods only up to that point where the amount of goods
expended to produce the product began to exceed the utility of the product itself.
152. N.Y. State Bar Association Tax Section Committee on Interstate Taxation,
Proposals for Improvement of Interstate Taxation Bills (H.R. 1538 and S. 317), 25 TAx
LAWYER 433, 459 (1972) [hereinafter cited as N.Y. State Bar A. Tax Section].
153. Cox, supra note 131, at 422.
154. Barber, supra note 135, at 249.
155. Studenski, supra note 97, at 1130.
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palpable as the services, such as police and fire protection,
provided in the state of manufacture. 5 '
It is also contended that the market state is not being ex-
ploited at all, because a sale is merely an exchange of equiva-
lent benefits.'57 The fact that the consumer is willing to make
the exchange means that in his or her mind the product re-
ceived is worth the money paid. To the extent that the con-
sumer would have been willing to pay more, he or she receives
a profit and the wealth of the market state is increased.'58 It is
for this reason (and not because of a desire to benefit the out-
of-state producer) that the consumer state tolerates the out-of-
state producer in its market.'
Several other arguments, both for and against the sales fac-
tor, are based upon pragmatic considerations rather than the
theoretical justification of sales as an apportionment factor.
For example, a clear majority of the authorities endorse the
adoption of the three-factor formula, either because the failure
to do so would reduce what uninformity has been achieved up
until now,6 0 or because it is the only formula capable of wide-
spread adoption without serious disruption of state revenues. 6'
Because less industrialized states have come to rely on the
revenues collected from out-of-state producers by means of
their three-factor formulas,6 2 it is argued that the sales factor
should be retained to allow the market states to share in in-
come tax revenues.'63 Nevertheless, both the fairness of such an
income transfer'64 and the desirability of accomplishing it
156. See Hartman, Multistate Business, supra note 124, at 78 n.208.
157. Studenski, supra note 97, at 1131.
158. Barnes, supra note 132, at 1278.
159. Studenski, supra note 97, at 1130.
160. See, e.g., Keesling and Warren, supra note 17, at 159.
161. See, e.g., Nemeth and Agee, supra note 33, at 250. Cf. Barnes, supra note 132,
at 224-25 (arguing that the sales factor, though "illogical, unreasonable, and ground-
less," cannot be eliminated without a substantial increase in the total tax take or a
drastic revision of rates, and that, consequently, a sales-by-origin factor should be
adopted).
162. N.Y. State Bar A. Tax Section, supra note 152, at 459. In recognition of this
dependence, some proponents of a federally mandated two factor formula have pro-
posed short run federal aid to those states hardest hit by such a change. Morss, supra
note 145, at 301.
163. Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 127, at 276.
164. In 1963, there was only a very rough correlation between the various states'
percentages of civilian income earned in manufacturing and average per capita in-
comes. Thus, use of the sales factor to apportion income to consumer states did not
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through state income tax apportionment'65 have been ques-
tioned.
However, a more fundamental dispute involves the theoret-
ical validity of the market state/manufacturing state distinc-
tion.' 6 If such a distinction is not economically sound, the
chances of effectuating any transfer of income between states
through the use of apportionment formulas are diminished, or
even eliminated.' 7 This was suggested in 1963 by the House
subcommittee which estimated that a nationwide conversion to
a two-factor property-payroll apportionment formula would
not cause more than a 1.6 percent decrease in any one state's
total revenues.6 " The reliability of the report's projections,
however, has been questioned because of the use of total reve-
nues, as opposed to income tax revenues, as a standard for
analyzing the impact of the switch,'69 and because of several
questionable assumptions used in arriving at the estimates.'7
In any event, opponents of the sales factor argue that the
serve to transfer income to where it was needed the most. See REP. 1480, supra note 4,
at 543-50.
165. "To permit the low income states to help themselves to the resources of the
high income states [through the use of sales apportionment] is to open the doors wide
to taxation chaos." Studenski, supra note 97, at 1133. Professor Studenski argues that
such income redistribution should only be implemented through the federal govern-
ment.
166. See REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 532-34.
167. Cf. Barnes, supra note 132, at 1277-78 (saying that no state can maintain a
net trade deficit for long, and that, consequently, "sharing the wealth . . . cannot be
accomplished by application of the 'market state' concept").
168. Only two jurisdictions were estimated to have more than a 1% decrease in total
revenues, Colorado and the District of Columbia. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 556-57.
Colorado, which employed a two-factor property-sales formula at the time, has since
adopted the Multistate Tax Compact, which includes the three-factor UDITPA for-
mula in its provisions, thereby reducing the weight of the sales factor from one-half to
one-third. The single-factor destination-sales formula used by the District of Columbia
at that time was found invalid on statutory grounds in 1965. See text accompanying
notes 180-185, infra.
169. According to the subcommittee's estimates, conversion to the standard three-
factor formula, instead of the two-factor property-payroll formula, would result in
differences of more than 20% of the total income tax revenues under the latter formula
in four jurisdictions. Thus, the four jurisdictions, the District of Columbia, Idaho, New
Mexico and North Dakota, could lose more than one-fifth of their income tax
revenues, ranging up to 47% in the latter state. See REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 542.
170. See Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 127, at 270-73 & n.57. While
not expressing an opinion as to the accuracy of the report results, Professor Hellerstein
concludes that "we simply do not have an adequate statistical basis for proceeding
with safety or confidence . . . to give up the receipts factor or the sales destination
test." Id. at 272.
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cost alone of complying with a tax system employing such a
factor precludes its use in an apportionment formula. 7' While
figures used in computing the property and payroll factors are
easy to determine and assign to the proper state, "no sales
factor can be adopted without creating at least some difficulty
for a substantial number of multistate taxpayers."' 72 To the
extent that sales are attributed to states where the taxpayer
would not otherwise be taxable, the sales factor increases com-
pliance expenses as a result of the greater number of returns
which must be filed. 73 Additionally, the difficulties involved
with enforcement of a tax against parties whose only connec-
tion with the taxing state is the sale of products within its
borders often results in a haphazard and arbitrary determina-
tion of who must ultimately pay tax.'74
B. The Court, The Congress and the States:
Several Steps Sideways Toward Uniformity
Nothing the Supreme Court has done up to this point has
significantly narrowed state discretion in the choice of income
tax apportionment formulas. It has never invalidated such a
formula on constitutional grounds, as the trial court did in the
Moorman case. On the contrary, by implication or otherwise,
the Supreme Court has recognized the validity of several of the
state apportionment formulas which have come before it.
The first such formula to be challenged in the Supreme
Court was a single-factor formula for manufacturing and trad-
ing companies, based entirely upon real and tangible personal
property within the state. The Court upheld that formula in
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain' against an attack
by a manufacturing firm located primarily in the taxing state,
which sold a substantial portion of its goods in other states.
Noting that the profits of the corporation "were largely earned
by a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in Con-
necticut and ending with sales in other States," the Court said
171. Cf. Harriss, supra note 130, at 327 (suggesting that a significant portion of
even corporate compliance expenditures are borne by the public by way of a reduced
federal income tax base).
172. RE . 1480, supra note 4, at 526.
173. See Hartman, Multi-state Business, supra note 124, at 79, cf. Barnes, supra
note 137, at 1281 (arguing for a sales-by-origin factor for this reason).
174. See Studenski, supra note 97, at 1134-37.
175. 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
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that the corporation had simply not shown that its instate
profits were less than the 47 percent arrived at by apportion-
ment.' 71 In several other cases challenging the application, as
opposed to the facial validity, of single-factor property formu-
las, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its Underwood hold-
ing. 77
The Court approved the use of the standard three-factor
formula in Butler Brothers v. McColgan: "We cannot say that
property, payroll and sales are inappropriate ingredients of an
apportionment formula." ' Similarly, in the companion cases
of Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and
Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, the Court, by holding
that the respective states had jurisdiction to tax the corpora-
tions, implicitly held that the standard three-factor formula,
and a modified three-factor formula (using inventory instead
of property as a factor) were free from constitutional defect. 79
More recently, however, the United States Supreme Court
has called into serious question the constitutionality of an ap-
portionment formula based entirely upon the sales factor. In
General M6tors Corp. v. District of Columbia,'"" the issue in-
volved the statutory validity of regulations promulgated by the
District Commissioners providing for the apportionment of in-
come by sales alone. Although the statute provided that the tax
should be imposed only on that income "as is fairly attributa-
ble to any trade or business carried on or engaged in within the
District," there was an express statutory provision that "[i]f
the trade or business of any corporation. . . is carried on...
176. Id. at 120-21. Despite this indication in Underwood that a factual presentation
may be sufficient to show the unconstitutionality of a particular application of an
apportionment formula, the Court has shown a great reluctance to accept separate
accounting, the only other method of making such a determination, to show the inaccu-
racy of the result arrived at by apportionment. See, e.g., Butler Bros. v. McColgan,
315 U.S. 501 (1942); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S.
271 (1924). But cf. Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Maxwell, 283 U.S.
123 (1931) (holding the application of an apportionment formula unconstitutional
despite the absence of actual evidence of unfairness due to its exclusion at the trial
level).
177. See, e.g., Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924)
(forrmula also including the intangible properties of accounts receivable and, to a
limited extent, shares of stock); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina ex rel. Max-
well, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
178. 315 U.S. 501, 509 (1942).
179. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). See also text accompanying notes 110-117, supra.
180. 380 U.S. 553 (1965).
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both within and without the District, the net income derived
therefrom shall . . .be deemed to be income from sources
within and without the District."'' The Court held the sales
apportionment regulation invalid under this statute.' 82
The decision may be seen as simply an application of the
latter provision of the District's statute, as the Court expressly
disavowed an intention "to take any position on the constitu-
tionality of a state income tax based on the sales factor
alone.' ' 18 3 However, language in the opinion certainly indicates
that the status of such a tax is in serious doubt.8 4 After quoting
extensively from the language in Underwood applying the
series-of-transactions "source" approach, the Court stated
that:
The standard three-factor formula can be justified as a rough,
practical approximation of the distribution of either a corpo-
ration's sources of income or the social costs which it gener-
ates. By contrast, the geographic distribution of a corpora-
tion's sales is, by itself, of dubious significance in indicating
the locus of either factor.' 5
Thus, the Court has indicated that the single-factor-sales
apportionment formula may not conform to the standards of
either the "source" test or the "benefits" test.' 6 With respect
to the overall problem of interstate taxation, the Supreme
Court is simply not in a position to bring about uniformity
among the states. While it may strike down particular appor-
tionment formulas in flagrant cases, it is not likely that the
Court will choose one among the several prevailing apportion-
ment systems and invalidate all conflicting formulas.'8 1 Conse-
quently, several writers have concluded that if the present sys-
tem of interstate taxation is to be made more uniform, congres-
sional action is needed to reverse the trend toward balkaniza-
181. D.C. CODE §§ 47-1580-80a (1961).
182. 380 U.S. at 561. (Justices Black and Douglas, both of whom had concurred in
the Northwestern decision, dissented from this decision).
183. 380 U.S. at 561.
184. Hellerstein, Unitary Business, supra note 10, at 493.
185. 380 U.S. at 561.
186. But cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamps, 308 U.S. 331 (1939) (upholding a
capital stock tax apportioned entirely upon the basis of gross receipts).
187. See Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical
Perspective, 29 VAND. L. Rxv. 335, 350-51 (1976); Developments in the Law, supra note
37, at 1018-19.
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tion of the national economy.'8
The prospects for such congressional action looked good in
1959, when, in almost immediate response to the outcry of
business in the aftermath of the Northwestern decision, Con-
gress for the first time in its history enacted a general statute
dealing with state taxation of interstate business. Public law
86-2721s provided that no state shall tax a person engaged in
interstate commerce, whose only connection with the taxing
state consists of "solicitation of orders. . . for sales of tangible
personal property . . . which orders are sent outside the State
for approval or rejection.""' More importantly in terms of the
long run prospects of interstate taxation, the law also called
upon the House Judiciary Committee to "make full and com-
plete studies of all matters pertaining to the taxation by the
States of income derived . . . from . . . interstate commerce
. . .for the purpose of recommending to the Congress proposed
legislation providing uniform standards in imposing income
taxes on income so derived."''
A special subcommittee on interstate taxation was estab-
lished and in 1964 the subcommittee published a report which
outlined the problems with the interstate tax system at that
time. The report concluded that "simplication in the multi-
state tax system, through reduction of its multiplicity, variety,
and mutability, is a necessary preliminary to achieving a rea-
sonable level of compliance within tolerable cost levels."' 92 The
following year the subcommittee published an ambitious set of
recommendations including the use of the two-factor property-
188. See, e.g., Celler, The Development of a Congressional Program Dealing with
State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 385, 386-87 (1968); see
also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476-77
(1959) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting); cf. Hellerstein, Interstate Business, supra note 127,
at 282-83 (calling for the creation of a federal agency to prescribe and administer
uniform apportionment formulas).
189. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555.
190. Id. § 101(a). While it did not overrule the Northwestern decision, Public Law
86-272 did overrule two Louisiana decisions, which had held mere solicitation by sales-
men who did not maintain any permanent physical establishment within the state was
sufficient to create jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for tax purposes. See Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue, 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958),
appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 28 (1959); International Shoe Co. v. Fontenot, 236 La. 279,
107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
191. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 201, 73 Stat. 555. The results of
this study have been cited extensively herein.
192. REP. 1480, supra note 4, at 384.
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payroll formula as the sole method for dividing income among
the states for tax purposes, without allowance for specific allo-
cation of "nonbusiness" income or for separate accounting in
special circumstances. The subcommittee also proposed that
the Treasury Department and the federal courts resolve con-
flicts in some cases where various states assert inconsistent
claims on a taxpayer's income.'93 A bill incorporating most of
these recommendations was introduced into the House194 and
the "outcry of business and the States was spontaneous and in
some instances explosive."' 95 Subsequently, a new bill was in-
troduced, eliminating the provisions relating to federal admin-
istration of state taxes and making the use of the two-factor
formula optional with the taxpayer. 9 ' Although this bill was
not considered by the full House during that term, similar bills
providing for the two-factor formula were passed by the House
of Representatives in both the Ninetieth and Ninety-First Con-
gresses.'97
There was strong opposition to the bills and the two-factor
formula'98 and the Senate did not even consider an interstate
taxation bill until the Ninety-Second Congress. 99 During the
following congress, an interstate taxation bill was introduced
in the Senate, which adopted the standard three-factor formula
instead of the House two-factor formula."0 As of this writing,
Congress is still deadlocked. A house bill, which incorporates
the two-factor property-payroll formula and a senate bill, em-
ploying the three-factor formula, have been introduced.20 ' Con-
193. SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 952,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1144, 1162-63 (1965).
194. H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
195. Cahoon and Brown, supra note 41, at 188. See Hearings on H.R. 11798 Before
the Special Subcomm. on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., series 14 (1966); cf. Nemeth and Agee, supra
note 33, at 250 (describing the hearings as a "dog and cat" fight).
196. H.R. 16491, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
197. H.R. 2158, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (passed May 22, 1968 by a vote of 284
to 89); H.R. 7906, 91st Cong., ist Sess. (1969) (passed June 25, 1969 by a vote of 311
to 87).
198. See Keesling and Warren, supra note 17, at 163. In 1967, the California legisla-
ture passed a resolution opposing enactment of H.R. 2158 unless the states fail, after
a reasonable time, to resolve the diversity problems on their own. Assembly J. Res. 25
(adopted July 27, 1967).
199. S. 317, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
200. S. 1245, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
201. H.R. 669, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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gress appears to be waiting for state tax administrators and
business concerns to reach a consensus before passing any com-
prehensive legislation in the area.
In reaction to the perceived threat of federal intervention,
the individual states, which had long been discounted as a
source of impetus toward uniformity,2 3 began showing signs of
moving toward that goal. Although only two states had enacted
the UDITPA at the time the house report was published,
twenty-seven of the forty-six corporate income tax jurisdictions
follow the UDITPA three-factor apportionment provisions as of
this writing. °1"More importantly with respect to apportion-
ment uniformity, thirty-eight of the corporate income tax
states either statutorily prescribe the standard three-factor for-
mula or make its use optional with the taxpayer.2 5 However,
since the federal uniformity bills have stalled in Congress, four
states which had previously used the standard formula have
changed their statutes to provide for use of a double-weight
sales formula. 2 1
IV. CONCLUSION
Interstate commerce and the taxation of out-of-state corpo-
rations are concerns of vital importance in our increasingly
interdependent national economy. With the decline of separate
202. See GLAZER, supra note 39, at 1004.
203. See, e.g., Hartman, Multistate Business, supra note 124, at 124-25; Heller-
stein, Interstate Business, supra note 127, at 265.
204. Twenty-five states have passed and follow the UDITPA for apportionment of
income. Two additional states, Missouri and Colorado, have adopted the Multistate
Tax Compact, which includes the UDITPA in its provisions. [1977] STATE TAX GUIDE
(CCH), at 1042-44. Although it follows the UDITPA for specific allocation of nonbusi-
ness income, West Virginia is the only state in the union which prescribes the two-
factor property-payroll formula. Id. at 10,925. Florida has also adopted the UDITPA,
but has modified the apportionment provisions to double-weight the sales factor. See
text accompanying notes 54-55, supra.
205. [1977] STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 10,203 - 10,943. This apparent uniformity
may be misleading, however. To the extent that varying definitions of the sales factor
are still used today, there exists a significant possibility of overtaxation. See text
accompanying notes 47-53, supra. Secondly, as noted earlier, states differ greatly as
to what income is to be specifically allocated and what income is to be subject to
apportionment. See text accompanying notes 33-42, supra. Lastly, even among states
which have adopted the UDITPA the implementation of the statute is not uniform.
Utah, for example, still resorts to separate accounting when formulary apportionment
would mean a serious loss of revenue to the state. See Cahoon and Brown, supra note
41, at 189.
206. See text accompanying notes 54-55, supra.
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accounting and specific allocation, apportionment is rapidly
becoming the predominant method for division of income
among the states for tax purposes. Because of these trends, the
need for a fair and uniform apportionment formula is becoming
more immediate.
For those who advocate the inclusion of the sales factor in
that formula, the application of the "source" test to the factor
results, at best, in a confused stalemate. The benefits principle,
on the other hand, seems most appropriate in the case of an
income tax, which, by definition, is imposed only upon those
with the immediate resources to pay it. It is argued that the
consumer state, the state to which the sales factor apportions
income, should be compensated for providing a market for the
foreign manufacturer. However, most services provided by the
market state, even those said to be involved with maintenance
of the market, such as providing roads on which vehicles can
be driven and maintaining a police force to protect goods from
theft, offer little to the out-of-state producer. The direct bene-
fits of such expenditures are enjoyed by the consumers located
within the market state-those who escape taxation by the use
of apportionment by sales.
The principal justification for the sales factor is, and has
always been, that individual states have had the power to
adopt it and have been unwilling to relinquish it. In recognition
of this fact, the sales factor was included in the UDITPA for-
mula and may well be included in the final version of a congres-
sional bill. Experience has shown that in this area the states
will continue to act in the interests of the national economy
only when there is a perceived threat of imminent federal inter-
vention. Thus, while the invalidation of the single-factor-sales
formula in the Moorman case would be only a small step to-
ward national uniformity, a failure to do so would constitute
two giant steps backward in the area of interstate taxation.
THOMAS J. NICHOLS
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